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The Dimensions of a Journalist's Shield-First
Amendment Protection for the Confidentiality of
News Sources Against Requests for Court-
Ordered Disclosure in Civil Cases
Before the 1970's, courts refused to find any constitutional
or common law protection for the confidentiality of news sources
when journalists resisted disclosure requests.1 Recently, how-
ever, both federal and state courts have begun denying disclo-
sure requests in civil litigation, reasoning that unlimited disclo-
sure deters the free flow of information from news sources to the
public.' Viewing this free flow of information as a first amend-
1. Courts ordered disclosure in civil cases, such as libel suits. Garland v. Torre, 259
F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). More frequently, however, the court orders arose in a criminal
context such as grand jury investigations. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York
County, 245 A.D. 97, 280 N.Y.S. 904 (App. Div. 1936). Journalists, however, rarely com-
plied with these orders. Only three journalists complied with court disclosure orders dur-
ing the one hundred-year period prior to 1970. A.D. Gordon, Protection of News Sources:
The History and Legal Status of the Newsman's Privilege 916-18 (Dec., 1970) (unpub-
lished thesis available in the University of Puget Sound Law School Library) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Protection of News Sources].
2. Eight circuits have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege to protect his
sources from forced disclosure of his confidential sources in some circumstances. Zerilli v.
Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.,
633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.
1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Steel-
hammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). The Seventh Circuit has not considered the
issue, although a district court in that circuit has found a qualified privilege. Gulliver's
Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. IlM. 1978). The
Sixth Circuit has not yet considered the issue. The Ninth Circuit has not formally recog-
nized a qualified privilege, although it has indicated that there is a first amendment
interest in protecting the confidentiality of news sources. "[T]he Supreme Court of the
United States has considered the question and appears to have fashioned at least a par-
tial First Amendment shield available to newsmen who are subjected to various demands
to divulge the source of confidentially secured information." Far v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d
464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 912 (1975).
Most states provide some statutory protection for confidential news sources. See
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ment interest of the public, the courts have found that this
interest warrants protection from the deterrent effect of court
disclosure orders.8
Although journalists have won some protection for their
news sources, this protection is not absolute.4 Employing various
balancing tests, the courts have found that in some cases a civil
litigant's need for the identity of the confidential source is
greater than the first amendment interest in keeping the news
source's identity secret.8 But in striking the balance between the
state's interest in providing the litigant with an effective forum
and the public's first amendment interest, the courts have failed
to provide predictable protection for confidential news sources.'
infra note 11. States without "shield" laws may recognize protection under the first
amendment, Morgan v. State, 337 So.. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); or through a common law privi-
lege, Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982). A few
states have refused to recognize any constitutional or common law protection for journal-
ists' sources. E.g., Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); Dow Jones Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d
847 (1973). For a comprehensive list of statutory and court protection for news sources
in state and federal courts, see NiNTH ANNUAL COMMUNICATIONs LAW INSTITUTE 476-500
(Practicing Law Institute 1981).
3. Although court protection of news sources is a recent development in first amend-
ment law, the limited protection is merely a new facet of an established judicial concern
for the effect of compulsory process on areas protected by the first amendment.
There is no doubt that legislative investigations, whether on a federal or state
level, are capable of encroaching upon the constitutional liberties of individu-
als. It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory
process be carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to
impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press....
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957).
4. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-85 (1972). The absolutist theory of the first
amendment is not without some adherents. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting). At least
one state legislature has enacted statutory protection for journalists' sources that is as
absolute as constitutionally permissible. See Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J.
176, 454 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 211 (1982).
5. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938
(1974).
6. One court has described the balancing test as "one that demands sensitivity,
invites flexibility, and defies formula." Bruno & Skillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspapers Co.,
633 F.2d 583, 598 (1st Cir. 1980). It should not be surprising that a court test that invites
flexibility and defies formula is unpredictable.
Interest balancing in other areas of first amendment law also has come under criti-
cism, particularly when the content of the speech defines the relative weight of the first
amendment interest. See Goldman, A Doctrine of Worthier Speech: Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc., 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 281, 301 (1977). The federal courts have never
suggested that the content of the information acquired from the news source should
determine the level of first amendment protection. But in practice, the content occasion-
ally appears to have exactly that effect. The heaviest weight given to the first amend-
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This comment suggests a test in civil cases that enables a court
to determine if there is a first amendment interest in protecting
the source's confidentiality.' If the journalist can demonstrate
this interest, then the burden shifts to the litigant seeking dis-
closure. This comment suggests three criteria through which the
litigant must persuade the court that the state's interest out-
weighs the first amendment interest. By using this clear, concise
test, the trial court need not engage in a separate interest bal-
ancing test in each case.8 The test suggested by this comment
should increase protection for the first amendment interest by
decreasing the number of disclosure orders issued and by giving
journalists and their confidential sources a basis for predicting
in advance of publication whether a disclosure order is likely.9
ment interest may well have occurred in a court ruling on a disclosure request related to
reporting on the Watergate burglary. Democratic Natl Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp.
1394, 1396-97 (D.D.C. 1973).
7. This comment only discusses the first amendment protection for confidential
sources in civil cases. The protection offered in criminal cases may be more restricted, at
least in the context of grand jury investigations. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707
(1972). In criminal trials, the first amendment may provide more protection than is
available from court disclosure orders in response to grand jury requests. United States
v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1981). Contra State v. Jascalevich (In re
Farber and New York Times Co.), 78 N.J. 259, 271-74, 394 A.2d 330, 336-37, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); State v. Rinaldo, No. 9976-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21,
1983) (court ordered disclosure of sources in camera prior to applying qualified common
law privilege).
This comment also does not address the issue of whether information gained from
nonconfidential sources merits protection. See Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299,
1303 (M.D. Fla. 1975). Compare Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 511
(E.D. Va. 1976).
8. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the case-by-case balancing test for a
specific set of criteria frequently used by the federal courts in conjunction with the bal-
ancing test. Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983); Senear
v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982). Although the Wash-
ington common law privilege does not require trial courts to balance the interests on a
case-by-case basis, it relied on the first amendment analysis of the state appellate court
and federal courts to determine the dimensions of the privilege.
[W]e believe the injury from failing to establish the privilege would be greater
than the benefit to be gained by requiring the testimony in civil litigation. See
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977); Gilbert v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Winegard v. Oxberger,
258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 56 L. Ed. 2d 402, 98 S.
Ct. 2234 (1978). While these cases all are concerned with whether there is a
First Amendment qualified privilege, their statements as to the balancing of
interests and the need for a qualified privilege are germane to the questions of
a common law privilege for reporters.
Id. at 154-55, 641 P.2d at 1183.
9. One court has suggested limiting the deterrent effect of court disclosure orders by
giving so much weight to the first amendment interest that the interest balancing test
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Less frequent and predictable disclosure orders will reduce the
deterrent effect of such orders, 0 protecting the constitutional
interest in the flow of information to the public.
In many states, a journalist and his news source have some
statutory protection from forced disclosure." However, language
in the statutes 2 and potential constitutional limitations" may
reduce or nullify the statutory protection. In federal courts,
14
and in states" in which the statutory protection is inadequate or
would almost invariably support protecting the source's confidentiality. Zerilli v. Smith,
656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
10. This comment argues that the first amendment interest the courts should focus
on is the public interest in removing the deterrent effect of disclosure orders on future
potential news sources. This is the same deterrent effect that caused the Court to protect
the identity of police sources in certain pretrial hearings. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 310-11 (1967).
11. Twenty-five states currently have shield laws offering some degree of testimonial
immunity as to a source's identity. Shield laws in some states also protect the journalist's
unpublished notes. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973);
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2214 to -2237 (1982 & Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-
917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-901 to
-909 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1982); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451 to -:1454
(West 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.5a (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.275 (1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.13 (West 1976 & West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
38-6-7 (1982); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .11, .12 (Page 1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 44.510-.540 (1981); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-208 (1980).
12. The California law protecting newspaper sources did not protect the sources for
magazine journalists, although it protected sources for daily newspapers. In re Cepeda,
233 F. Supp. 465, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The state legislature subsequently expanded
the law's protection. CAL. Evw. CODE § 1070 (West 1966 & Supp. 1982).
13. A defendant's sixth amendment compulsory process rights may nullify the pro-
tection of a shield law in a criminal trial. State v. Jascalevich (In re Farber and New
York Times Co.), 78 N.J. 259, 271-74, 394 A.2d 330, 336-37, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978). A shield law would also have to yield to a constitutional provision in a civil trial.
14. Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197,
1200 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The court did not apply the Illinois shield law in this case, because
a private antitrust action involved a federal claim. See FED. R. EvID. 501. There is no
federal shield law, so the first amendment is the sole source of protection for the public's
interest in the flow of information when a party in a federal action seeks to force disclo-
sure of a confidential news source. See Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARv. J.
ON LEGIs. 233 (1974). Federal courts, however, may give some weight to a strong state
policy for protecting news sources even though federal law controls. Riley v. City of
Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979).
15. Washington is the only state on the West Coast without a shield law. See supra
note 11. In Senear, the journalist successfully sought protection for his source's confiden-
tiality under the first amendment in the appellate court. Senear v. Daily Journal-Ameri-
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nonexistent, journalists frequently resort to claims of first
amendment protection.16 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has never fully defined the parameters of first amend-
ment protection for journalists' confidential news sources in civil
cases.
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 7 the Supreme Court did address
the issue of first amendment protection for news sources, when a
grand jury seeks the identity of the source in the context of a
secret criminal investigation. Although the Court acknowledged
that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated,"16 Justice White's majority
opinion held that these journalists had no first amendment right
to withhold testimony from a grand jury.19 Specifically, the
Court found that existing grand jury procedures provided ade-
quate protection for a newsman's sources.20 The procedures
can, 27 Wash. App. 454, 618 P.2d 536 (1980). The Washington Supreme Court also
provided limited protection, but established a common law, rather than a constitutional,
qualified privilege. Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983);
Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982); cf. State v.
Rinaldo, No. 9976-1-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1983) (before applying common law priv-
ilege in criminal case, the court ordered in camera disclosure to trial judge).
16. The first amendment, through the fourteenth amendment, only protects free-
dom of the press from state action. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). The
state action is the court's disclosure order. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 560 (1980) (court order closing trial violated first amendment right to
attend criminal trials). Although the Court in recent years has cut back on the scope of
state action, see, e.g., Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), the Court has
consistently found state action when either the judiciary or another branch of govern-
ment impinges on a first amendment right through the use of compulsory process, Globe
Newspaper Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2618 (1982); see supra note 3.
The state interest behind the action is in providing the litigant with a cause of action
and the means to obtain evidence relevant to that cause of action. This comment will
occasionally refer to the state's interest as the litigant's interest in obtaining disclosure of
the confidential source.
A plurality of the Washington Supreme Court, however, recently held that the state
constitution protects freedom of speech and the press from private actions. Alderwood
Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243, 635 P.2d 108, 115-16 (1981).
See Note, Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council: State Action
and the Washington Constitution, 5 U. Puwr SouND L. RV. 331 (1982). This comment,
however, is restricted to the protection through the first and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution.
17. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
18. Id. at 681.
19. Justice White limited the holding in the first sentence of the opinion. "The issue
in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal
grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 667.
20. Id. at 695.
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cited for this finding were the secrecy of grand jury proceedings,
a prosecutor's charge to consider the public interest, and the
prosecutor's experience in protecting police sources. 1 These fac-
tors ensuring the confidentiality of a news source in a grand jury
proceeding are not present in a civil case. Thus, the Branzburg
majority's opinion should have limited application outside of the
grand jury setting. 2
The concurring opinion of Justice Powell2 and the four dis-
senting Justices' 4 analyses further limit the precedential value
of Branzburg. Although Justice Powell joined the majority opin-
ion, his brief concurring opinion emphasized the limited scope of
the majority opinion and agreed with the four dissenters that
there was a first amendment interest in protecting the news
source's confidentiality.2  Justices Stewart's 6 and Douglas'2 7 dis-
senting opinions placed even greater emphasis on the first
amendment rights at stake when a journalist's confidential news
source faces disclosure through a court order. Some courts s and
commentators29 have argued that the four dissenters together
with Justice Powell represented a majority of the Court support-
ing constitutional protection of news sources in non-grand jury
settings. Even if this "majority" does not form a basis for consti-
21. Id. Justice White's opinion appears to assume that a prosecutor would have as
much interest in protecting a journalist's confidential source as a confidential source of
the police. Regardless of the validity of this assumption, the protection is clearly
unavailable when a party in a civil suit seeks disclosure of a confidential source. The
scope of this comment is limited to the latter situation.
22. See supra note 7.
23. 408 U.S. 665, 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
24. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have held that
the first amendment provides a qualified privilege in the grand jury context. Id. at 725
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas contended that the first amendment provides
absolute protection for a journalist's confidential source. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
25. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's brief concurring opinion sug-
gested restricting the Court's holding without developing a standard for future courts.
Justice Stewart termed Justice Powell's opinion "enigmatic." Id. at 725 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
26. Justice Stewart would have held that the state must prove the compelling and
overriding importance of the grand jury inquiry, show the precise relevance of the infor-
mation sought to a precisely defined subject of the inquiry, demonstrate that the journal-
ist has the information requested and prove that there are no alternative means of
acquiring the information. Id. at 739-40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28. E.g., New Hampshire v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499 (1982).
29. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for News-
men, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 709, 718 (1975).
[Vol. 6:285
1983] Dimensions of a Journalist's Shield
tutional protection of news sources, the Justices' reasoning at
least reaffirms the limited applicability of the Branzburg
holding.
Although Branzburg may not articulate the degree of first
amendment protection for sources in civil cases, lower federal
courts have suggested that the first amendment interest under-
lying a journalist's request for protection of his source's identity
is the public's need to be fully informed. 0 The states adopted
the first amendment at a time when an informed public was
viewed as a prerequisite to a democratic system.3 1 The Court has
recently held that "freedom of the press" protects those activi-
ties that ensure that the public has the information essential to
a system of self-government. 2
Thus, first amendment protection goes beyond the direct
exercise of the freedoms of speech and press to protect activities
vital to the exercise of those freedoms."3 Because the Court has
clearly identified these first amendment rights as the public's,"
the journalist seeking first amendment protection for his confi-
30. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1978); Democratic
Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D.D.C. 1973).
31. "A popular government without popular information or the means of achieving
it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps both." 6 WRITNGS OF JAMES MADISON
398 (Hunt ed. 1906).
32. The Court, for example, has held that the public has a first amendment right to
attend criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Two
years later a majority of the Court reaffirmed this holding on the basis of a first amend-
ment interest in providing information to the public. "Thus to the extent that the First
Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this consti-
tutionally protected discussion of governmental affairs is an informed one." Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1982).
33. [W]e have long eschewed any "narrow, liberal conception" of the Amend-
ment's terms, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 ... (1963), for the Framers
were concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a background of
shared values and practices. The First Amendment is thus broad enough to
encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very
terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other
First Amendment rights.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. at 2619 (1982). Protection of news-
gathering activities qualified as one of those rights essential to the exercise of the first
amendment freedoms of the press. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
34. The Court has generally adopted a marketplace of ideas rationale when articu-
lating first amendment values. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
The Court has interpreted the first amendment broadly to protect this marketplace of
ideas. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722
(1931).
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dential source is not exerting a right of journalists as a class35 or
of the source as an individual. 6 The extent of this public right
of access to information or to unrestricted news gathering is not
clear.3 7 The Court, however, has held that the freedoms of
speech and press must be vigorous enough to provide a check on
the government, such a check being an "essential component in
our structure of self-government."" If court-ordered disclosure
of confidential news sources impairs the public's ability to
acquire the information essential to effective self-government,
the orders impinge on the public's first amendment rights.39 If
court orders deter future news sources from providing the public
with information through the press, then the courts are impair-
ing the exercise of first amendment freedoms.
Empirical data on the deterrent effect of disclosure orders
35. The Court has refused to recognize any first amendment rights of journalists or
the news media generally beyond those available to the public as a whole. Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1973); see generally Comment, News-Source Privilege
in Libel Cases, A Critical Analysis, 57 WASH. L. Rav. 349, 364 (1982).
36. Some commentators, however, have argued that the courts should consider the
sources' first amendment rights separately. Note, The Rights of Sources-The Critical
Element in the Clash Over Reporter's Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202, 1203 n.7 (1979). The
Washington Constitution contains a provision that may provide protection for the source
himself. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 177-78, 622 P.2d
1199, 1205-06 (1980).
37. The Court's willingness to protect the public's access to information in criminal
trials has not been accompanied by a specific articulation of the nature of the right. "It is
not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials to hear, see and com-
municate observations concerning them as a right of access . . . or a 'right to gather
information'. . . ." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
Although the Branzburg Court did not find a threat to the first amendment when a
journalist was forced to disclose his source in a secret grand jury proceeding, the Court
did recognize a constitutional interest in protecting newsgathering activities. "[W]ithout
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); accord Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389
(1967).
38. [T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in
the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. Public
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of
the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a
whole. Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of
fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. And in the
broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to partici-
pate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-an essential component
in our structure of self-government.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1982)(footnotes omitted);
see Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, A.B. FouND. RasEARcH J.
521, 524 (1977).
39. See supra note 32.
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are inconsistent and incomplete. Surveys of publishers'0 and
affidavits from individual journalists41 indicate that guaranteed
confidentiality is a critical element of the flow of information to
the public. Other surveys42 find no deterrent effect. But even
unanimity would not make these surveys determinative because
journalists, rather than the sources, are the respondents to the
surveys. A definitive finding could be obtained only by surveying
those potential sources who decide not to give their information
to the public via journalists, a concededly difficult, if not impos-
sible, survey to implement.
In the absence of definitive data, the federal appellate
courts have found the deterrent effect self-evident. 43 A self-
evident finding is consistent with the Supreme Court's position
that disclosure of confidential sources for law enforcement agen-
cies would deter the flow of information essential for effective
law enforcement. In McCray v. Illinois,4 the Court found disclo-
sure's deterrent effect on confidential police sources self-evident
because of the personal safety concerns of the sources.45 The
Court has identified similar personal safety concerns for news
sources unable to maintain their confidentiality. 4' These per-
sonal safety concerns are part of the apparent self-evident deter-
rent that federal appellate courts have inferred from the pros-
pect of forced news source disclosure.'7
40. Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969).
41. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 n.31 (1972).
42. Comment, News-Source Privilege in Libel Cases: A Critical Analysis, 57 WASH.
L. REv. 349, 364 n.89 (1982).
43. The interrelationship between newsgathering, news dissemination and the
need for a journalist to protect his or her source is too apparent to require
belaboring. A journalist's inability to protect the confidentiality of sources s/he
must use will jeopardize the journalist's ability to obtain information on a con-
fidential basis. . . . This in turn will seriously erode the essential role played
by the press in the dissemination of information and matters of interest and
concern to the public.
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third Circuit's discussion
here is more extensive than the typical federal decision on the topic of the deterrent
effect of court disclosure orders.
44. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
45. Id. at 308-09.
46. Although the Branzburg Court found that grand juries could protect the confi-
dentiality of news sources, the Court acknowledged that news sources may fear wide-
spread disclosure of their identity for reasons of "job security, personal safety, or peace
of mind." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972).
47. Personal safety concerns are not restricted to the criminal context, as one might
suspect. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (dissident
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Furthermore, a source who fails to make confidentiality a
prerequisite for parting with his information can hardly claim
that he was unlikely to volunteer information if he subsequently
faces forced disclosure. The first amendment concern for the
flow of information from the news source to the public is present
only if the source requires confidentiality before parting with the
information. 48  There is no self-evident burden on the first
amendment interest when, in the particular case, the prospect of
a disclosure order did not concern the source.
The interest in protecting a news source's identity, although
of great significance to the first amendment freedoms, is not
absolute.49 Balanced against the public's first amendment inter-
est in the flow of information is the state's interest in a civil
litigant's ability to obtain all the information necessary to the
resolution of his case.50 The state's interest in providing an effec-
tive forum to settle disputes depends on the importance of the
information sought to the litigant's case.5" The state's interest in
Teamster members' publication sued for libel by Teamster officials who seek disclosure
of sources for critical story on pension funds), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1981).
48. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596-98 (1st Cir.
1980).
49. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50. While this comment is limited to civil litigation, several courts have found the
state's interest greater in a criminal trial than a civil trial. This civil-criminal distinction
is probably the primary reason that the rationale of Branzburg has not been applied by
the federal courts when considering disclosure requests from civil litigants.
This is a civil libel suit rather than a grand jury inquiry into crime, and the
dispute over disclosure is between the press and a private litigant rather than
between the press and Government. This difference is of some importance,
since the central thrust of Justice White's opinion for the Court concerns the
traditional importance of grand juries and the strong public interest in effec-
tive enforcement of the criminal law. Justice White also relied on the various
procedures available to prosecutors and grand juries to protect informants and
on careful use by the Government of the power to compel testimony. Private
litigants are not similarly charged with the public interest and may be more
prone to seek wholesale and indiscriminate disclosure.
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 n.6 (1974). Regardless of whether the state's interest is
greater in a civil or criminal case, the opportunities for disclosure of a confidential news
source are greater in the criminal context due to the Branzburg decision and the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process. See State v. Jascalevich (In re Far-
ber and New York Times Co.), 78 N.J. 259, 271-74, 394 A.2d 330, 336-37, cert. denied,
439 U.S. 997 (1978). Because a potential news source is likely to be able to predict
whether his information could lead to a criminal versus a civil case, this comment sug-
gests a qualified privilege in civil cases where the potential for minimizing the number of
court disclosure orders and facilitating the flow of information is greatest.
51. Thus, the nature of the civil action will not affect the state's interest, although
requests for disclosure have occurred in a broad variety of civil contexts. See, e.g., Zerilli
v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (privacy action); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v.
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providing litigants with an opportunity, a forum, to peaceably
adjudicate their claims may be stronger than the first amend-
ment interest, if confidentiality totally frustrates a litigant's
ability to prove his claim. If alternative sources exist or the
importance of the news source's identity is marginal to the cause
of action, the state's interest becomes less important relative to
the public's first amendment interest. The state interest, how-
ever, will be greater than the first amendment interest in those
exceptional cases in which the litigant's cause of action is totally
dependent on the source's identity.
Libel suits also demonstrate that the first amendment inter-
ests may not arise in every case in which a journalist seeks to
protect a confidential source. Under New York Times v. Sulli-
van,52 a public figure-plaintiff must prove in a libel case that the
allegedly libelous material was printed with reckless disregard
for the truth or with knowledge that it was false.5 3 If an alleg-
edly libelous story were totally based on unnamed sources, the
plaintiff may need to force disclosure of the confidential sources
to show that the sources either did not exist or were totally
unbelievable. As there is no first amendment interest in the free
flow of false information published recklessly or with knowledge
of its falsity, 54 any news source privilege should not absolutely
eliminate the civil litigant's power to force disclosure of a jour-
nalist's sources.
In deciding whether to protect a journalist's sources, federal
courts5 5 have developed a balancing of interests test, but the test
Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. II. 1978) (private antitrust);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla, 1975) (civil rights action).
The courts also have declined to rank civil actions based on the relative importance
to the state.
It would be inappropriate for a court to pick and choose in such gross fashion
between different acts of Congressional legislation, labelling one "exceedingly
important" and another less so, without specific directions from the Legisla-
ture. While we recognize that there are cases - few in number to be sure -
where First Amendment rights must yield, we are still mindful of the preferred
position which the First Amendment occupies in the pantheon of freedoms.
Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. Id. at 280.
54. "[Tihere is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
55. See supra note 2. Every circuit that has considered the issue has found a quali-
fied privilege in civil cases. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A few
state courts, however, have found Justice White's opinion in Branzburg equally applica-
ble to civil cases. See Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 294, 562 P.2d 791,
19831 295
296 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 6:285
provides an inadequate basis for future news sources to predict
whether courts will protect their confidentiality.5 6 Courts recog-
nizing a limited testimonial privilege have not used criteria
developed with the objective of limiting the deterrent effect on
future news sources.57 Most courts, for example, require litigants
to seek out alternative sources,58 but fail to specify that at a
minimum those alternative sources must include those the jour-
nalist suggests. A news source should be able to retain his confi-
dentiality if he can suggest, through the journalist, an alterna-
tive source for the information. Additionally, courts require that
the information sought by the litigant "go to the heart of the
matter,""9 be critical to the cause of action,60 or be of specific
necessity to the litigant's case."' These three definitions of this
criterion are so imprecise that their application may vary from
case to case. Finally, the typical judicial balancing test requires a
797 (1977); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 320, 303 N.E.2d 847, 851-
52 (1973). See also Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Every-
man's Right to Evidence, 47 OR. L. REv. 243 (1968).
56. The First Circuit's description of the interest balancing test is indicative of the
lack of specific guidelines available to a trial judge.
The task is one that demands sensitivity, invites flexibility, and defies formula.
While obviously the discretion of the trial judge has wide scope, it is a discre-
tion informed by an awareness of First Amendment values and the pre-
cedential effect which decision in any one case would be likely to have.
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 598 (1st Cir. 1980).
57. At least one circuit has suggested that the balancing test should be so heavily
weighted toward the first amendment that disclosure would require a truly exceptional
case.
[I]n the ordinary case the civil litigant's interest in disclosure should yield to
the journalist's privilege. Indeed, if the privilege does not prevail in all but the
most exceptional cases, its value will be substantially diminished. Unless
potential sources are confident that compelled disclosure is unlikely, they will
be reluctant to disclose any confidential information to reporters.
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
This comment, however, suggests that both the first amendment interest and the
state interest will be better served by a set of specific criteria that enable a journalist and
his source to predict in advance of publication whether a court is likely to grant a disclo-
sure order in subsequent litigation.
58. Id. at 714-15.
59. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958).
60. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 717 (3d Cir. 1978).
61. Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 155, 641 P.2d 1180, 1183
(1982). The Washington court did not provide protection for the journalist's sources
under the Constitution but created a common law privilege. The qualified privilege does
not include an interest balancing test but rather adopts the criteria from the federal
court's constitutional privilege without the interest balancing test. Id. at 157, 641 P.2d at
1183-84.
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showing of undefined independent merit." Sometimes, courts
may limit this criterion to protecting news sources only from liti-
gants whose claims are frivolous.63 Used in this way, the crite-
rion is of questionable predictive value as a news source cannot
tell in advance whether a litigant may file a cause of action friv-
olously or in good faith.
These imprecise standards undermine the predictability of
the disclosure. It is the absence of predictability that infringes
the first amendment interest in the flow of information from
confidential news sources. When devising specific criteria, courts
should focus on the news source with the objective of giving him
a basis for predicting whether courts will protect his confidenti-
ality. If the criteria did enable the news source to predict with
confidence that in his case the journalist will not face a disclo-
sure order, then disclosure orders in other cases will not have a
deterrent effect on him, and the first amendment interest in the
flow of information to the public will be protected.
In describing the dimensions of the privilege suggested by
this comment, the facts of a specific case are helpful for refer-
ence and illustrative purposes. A recent Washington case,
Senear v. Daily Journal-American,64 illustrates the competing
interests that arise when a civil litigant seeks a court order
requiring disclosure of a confidential source, and the journalist
claims first amendment protection. In 1977, John Senear, a busi-
ness agent for a transit workers' local, was negotiating with the
Seattle metropolitan transportation agency.15 During the negoti-
ations and accompanying "sick outs," the Daily Journal-Ameri-
can of Bellevue, a suburban newspaper, published a story quot-
ing unnamed sources who were critical of Senear's leadership."
Senear filed a libel action against the newspaper and issued
62. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973).
63. The Washington court, for example, failed to define meritorious specifically,
thus leaving the possibility that trial courts would limit this criterion to cases brought
frivolously or for harassment purposes. Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d
148, 155, 641 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1982). Such an interpretation would not include suits
brought in good faith that have little or no merit. Disclosure orders in cases of this type
would create a deterrent effect, because future sources will not be in a position to predict
whether a suit that lacks merit will be brought for harassment purposes, frivolously, or in
good faith.
64. 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982).
65. Id. at 150, 641 P.2d at 1181.
66. Id.
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interrogatories seeking the identity of the sources.6 7 The Daily
Journal-American refused to identify the sources but gave the
names of three people who could confirm that the newspaper
had accurately reported the accusations made by the confiden-
tial sources.6 8 Senear then obtained a court order directing the
Daily Journal-American to disclose the sources' names." The
paper appealed, maintaining that confidentiality was necessary
to protect the sources from reprisals.70 Disclosure of the sources'
identities, the paper also argued, would deter future sources
from volunteering information to journalists, thus endangering
the flow of information to the public.71 Alleging that the Daily
Journal-American published the article in reckless disregard of
the truth, Senear claimed that he needed to know the sources'
identities to rebut the newspaper's claim that it had made a rea-
sonable investigation of the facts before publication. Because
Senear presents the prototypical disclosure conflict over a confi-
dential news source, this comment will refer to the case's factual
background to demonstrate the importance of predictability of
court disclosure orders to the flow of news to the public.
To provide the necessary predictability, courts should apply
a specific test to disclosure motions that will (1) insure that dis-
closure only results when the state's interest is paramount and
(2) give the journalist and source a basis for determining in
advance of publication whether disclosure will occur. The first
step in determining whether the first amendment interest is par-
amount is ascertaining whether the journalist is raising a first
amendment interest.78 Once the journalist establishes a first
amendment interest, the burden then shifts to the litigant. Tl~e
litigant must prove to the court that the state interest is para-
mount to the first amendment interest by proving the requested
information and his case meet three specific criteria: the disclo-
sure must be necessary to prove an element of the cause of
action;7 1 the information must not be available through alterna-
67. Id.
68. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148,
641 P.2d 1180 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
69. Senear, 97 Wash. 2d at 151, 641 P.2d at 1181 (1982).
70. Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 3-4.
71. Brief for Appellant at 5, Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641
P.2d 1180 (1982).
72. Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 5.
73. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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tive means;7" and the litigant's claim must have independent
merit.76
A journalist must first prove that he is collecting informa-
tion to disseminate to the general public and that a promise of
confidentiality was necessary to obtain the information. First
amendment interests require a broad definition of "journalist"
to include any person collecting information for dissemination to
the general public."7 The Branzburg majority was concerned
that individuals masquerading as journalists would claim the
protection to conceal evidence. 8 Subsequent courts, however,
have had little difficulty determining whether someone was act-
ing as a journalist or in some other capacity. 79
A more difficult issue is whether a journalist's relationship
to the litigation should affect his ability to invoke the newsman's
qualified privilege. In columnist Jack Anderson's suit against
former President Nixon for tapping the columnist's telephone,
the court refused to allow Anderson to invoke the privilege as
both a "shield and sword."80 The court correctly denied Ander-
son's request for protection for his source because Anderson vol-
untarily subjected his sources to the danger of disclosure by
filing an action related to the information acquired from his
sources.8 " A defendant-reporter, however, is an involuntary par-
ticipant in a court suit and should be able to seek protection for
his sources.8 2
After the subject of a disclosure order has proved that he
qualifies as a journalist, he must establish a first amendment
interest by showing that the news source demanded confidential-
75. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
77. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
78. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-05 (1972).
79. Subsequent courts have been able to distinguish a newspaper owner's business
activities from his journalistic pursuits, requiring disclosure when the former was
involved. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185, 187, 191 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
80. Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 1978).
81. Id. at 1200-01.
82. A journalist-defendant may have a self-serving motive in seeking protection for
his source. However, a journalist who is not a party to a suit is likely to be concerned
only with his journalistic ethics when refusing to disclose his sources. Clampitt v. Thur-
ston County, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 658 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1983). The criteria should
bring greater protection to the non-party-journalist than the defendant-journalist. As a
central figure in the litigation, the defendant-journalist is more likely to have been a
source who is instrumental to an element of the cause of the action. The source of a non-
party-journalist will probably have only a tangential relationship to the suit.
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ity in return for his information."' If the confidentiality was a
prerequisite to the information, the courts should not issue a
disclosure order unless the party seeking disclosure can meet the
three criteria discussed below.
Under the first criterion, the party seeking disclosure must
show that the information is necessary, and not merely supple-
mental, to establish an element of his cause of action. This stan-
dard is more precise than the traditional test of information
either "going to the heart of the matter, 8 4 or compelling a
finding of specific necessity,85 or critical to the cause of action."6
The proposed standard of "necessity" would require that the
information be more than relevant or important-it must be
indispensable to the cause of action. By applying this standard,
courts will greatly restrict the availability of disclosure orders,
requiring disclosure only when necessary to discover the only
credible evidence available to prove an element of the cause of
action. The granting of fewer orders reduces the cumulative
deterrent effect of those orders on the flow of information. If the
litigant is unable to show that the requested information does
more than merely supplement other evidence proving an ele-
ment, then a disclosure motion should fail.8 7
This criterion enhances the predictability of disclosure
orders by giving the journalist and his source a basis for predict-
ing the context in which a disclosure order may arise. Obviously,
predicting all the different causes of action in which disclosure
may be requested is impossible, but the journalist and his source
should be able to determine the types of litigation that have ele-
ments which may be proved only through disclosure of the
source's identity. For example, the Daily Journal-American
83. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
84. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
85. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 717 (3d Cir. 1978).
86. Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 155, 641 P.2d 1180, 1183
(1982).
87. One effect of this requirement would be to delay a court ruling on a disclosure
motion until discovery had proceeded far enough to make an initial evaluation of the
proof for the cause of action. Applying this criterion to Senear, the trial court would
have denied the disclosure motion until the plaintiff had laid a foundation, through dis-
covery, showing that the information was the only means of proving an element of the
libel claim. To enable the plaintiff to do this, the trial court would first have to decide
whether Senear was a public figure. Until a ruling on the question of public figure status
is made, the plaintiff will not know what legal standard he must meet. Miller v. Trans-
american Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981).
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reporter and his sources could easily have predicted that Senear
might file a libel suit. Because the source's credibility might be a
means of proving the standard of care in preparing the article,88
the journalist and sources could predict that the identity of
sources would be relevant to an essential element of a libel
claim. 9 The journalist and source should be able not only to
predict but also to control the degree of relevance of the confi-
dential source's identity to the libel suit. If the journalist uses
the source's information to corroborate other information in the
story rather than to exclusively support the story, the journalist
and source may limit the importance of the source's identity to
future libel litigation.
But even if the information sought through disclosure is
indispensable to prove an element of the cause of action, indis-
pensability by itself would be insufficient to justify a disclosure
order. Under the second criterion, the party requesting disclo-
sure also would be required to prove that the essential informa-
tion is not available from alternative nonconfidential sources.
The court must exercise its discretion in assessing whether the
requesting party has exhausted alternative sources.90 At a mini-
88. The exact standard of care to be applied would vary depending on whether a
trial court classified Senear as a private or public figure. Compare Taskett v. KING
Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 445, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976) with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
89. Certainly there are other contexts in which a suit may arise that neither the
source nor journalist could predict, but these unanticipated cases are unlikely to involve
the source's identity directly. For example, the Daily Journal-American reporter and
source might not be able to predict a suit by the union for breach of fiduciary duty by
Senear for his alleged personal job inquiry through management officials during the con-
tract negotiations, or a suit by Senear for discharge from his union job as a result of the
allegations, or criminal charges out of a federal investigation of labor racketeering. In the
first hypothetical suit, the identity of the sources would not involve an essential element
of the claim. The sources' information about Senear's interviews with Metro officials for
a job with the credit union might be an essential element, but the sources and journalist
could predict that this information was available from the Metro officials themselves.
Senear v. Daily Journal-American, No. 840-237, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 8 Media L.
Rptr. 2489 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1982). The alternative means of obtaining this
information also would be available in a suit for unlawful discharge. See infra notes 90-
93 and accompanying text. Finally, in the hypothetical criminal action, the journalist and
source would know that their information did not involve any criminal activity, so any
criminal litigation would not involve their confidential relationship.
90. Courts should require the party seeking disclosure to show that it has made
some attempt to discover the information through alternative means. This requirement
should only be waived if the alternative means are obviously too speculative or burden-
some. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Cf. Carey v. Hume, 492
F.2d 631, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court placed much greater emphasis on the burden of
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mum, a litigant should investigate alternative sources suggested
by the journalist before a court considers granting a disclosure
order. The trial court in Senear, for example, should have
required Senear to depose the three union members whom the
Daily Journal-American named, before ruling on Senear's
request for a disclosure order.91 Strict compliance with this crite-
rion should limit the deterrent effect of disclosure orders in two
ways. First, the resulting decrease in disclosure orders will
reduce the cumulative deterrent effect. Second, the strict com-
pliance will assure the journalist and source that any reasonable
alternative means they suggest will be investigated by the
requesting litigant before the court orders disclosure.
The alternative source criterion does not offer absolute or
permanent protection. The courts should use their discretion
and not require a search made impractical by the number or
location of alternative sources.92 Furthermore, a litigant denied a
disclosure order may subsequently exhaust alternative sources
without success and ultimately obtain a court disclosure order.93
Under the third criterion, the party seeking disclosure must
prove the independent merit of his claim. A court should not
order disclosure, unless the litigant's claim alleges both a valid
cause of action and enough facts to support the legal claim
asserted." The "independent merit" criterion represents the
core of the state interest which all three criteria measure. Thus,
if a litigant's cause of action does not have independent merit,
there is no state interest behind the disclosure order to outweigh
the first amendment interest in protecting the source's
confidentiality.
A litigant may prove the independent merit of his claim by
one of two methods. Typically, the litigant does this by with-
discovery to the litigant than did Zerilli court, which emphasized the importance of
confidentiality).
91. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
92. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1974). A few courts have suggested
the number of sources that might be deposed. "[W]e see no reason why deposing 60 (and
perhaps even more) planning employees was not a reasonable alternative to compelling
reporter disclosure. Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 645-46, 658 P.2d 641,
645 (1983). See also Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
93. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 723, 727 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
94. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 993 (8th Cir. 1972)(trial court properly
granted summary judgment dismissing meritless libel claims against magazine before rul-
ing on plaintiff's request to order disclosure of confidential news sources), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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standing a motion for summary judgment.95 Absent a motion for
summary judgment, the litigant produces the required evidence
as part of his motion for disclosure. The latter method allows a
litigant to prove the independent merit of his claim in cases in
which his opponent does not bring a motion for summary judg-
ment or cases in which an essential element of the cause of
action is only available through disclosure of the confidential
source's identity."6
This criterion should enhance the predictability of disclo-
sure orders in cases, such as libel suits, in which the journalist is
a defendant. The journalist may exercise so much care in the
preparation of a story that no plaintiff could possibly survive a
summary judgment motion.9 7 In the case of a public figure-
plaintiff, such as Senear," the reporter could demonstrate to the
confidential source that he was preparing the article with such
care that the public figure-plaintiff could not possibly prove that
the allegedly defamatory article was published recklessly.9
By requiring parties seeking disclosure to show the indepen-
dent merit of their claims, exhaust alternative sources, and
demonstrate that disclosure is necessary to prove an element of
the cause of action, the trial court need not balance the interests
in each case. When applying the criteria, the court must focus
on enhancing the predictability of disclosure orders to safeguard
the public's first amendment interest.100 The court's sensitive
application of the criteria will protect the public's first amend-
ment interest in facilitating the flow of truthful information and
95. Id. at 992-93.
96. The trial court must exercise discretion and not deny a disclosure motion when
a litigant cannot establish the independent merit of his claim, because the only way to
prove an essential element is through disclosure of a confidential news source. See supra
notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 89.
98. After the Washington Supreme Court established a common law privilege in
Senear and remanded the case, the trial court granted the Daily Journal-American's
motion for summary judgment on remand. Daily Journal-American v. Senear, 8 Media L.
Rptr. 2489, 2493 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1982). The court also declined a request for
disclosure, based partially on the lack of merit in the plaintiff's case. Id. at 2490-91.
99. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973). The substantial efforts that the publication made to verify its story permit-
ted the trial judge in this case to dismiss the libel suit on a motion for summary judg-
ment without ruling on the plaintiff's request for a disclosure order directed at the publi-
cation's confidential sources.
100. Thus, the test is not totally mechanical. The criteria of the test, however,
rather than the court's balancing of interests, mitigate any deterrent effect from the dis-
closure orders that are granted. For a comparison, see supra note 57.
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limit the deterrent effect of the remaining disclosure orders by
increasing the predictability of those orders and by decreasing
the number of disclosure requests and orders issued. The
increase in predictability will foster the decrease in the number
of disclosure orders. By predicting the likelihood of a disclosure
order, news sources will provide the journalist with information
when the first amendment interest is greatest and the likelihood
of disclosure least, and will withhold the information when the
state's interest is greatest and the likelihood of a disclosure
order highest.10 1 The refusal of the news source to provide the
public with information in the latter case not only recognizes the
stronger state interest but also indirectly advances the public's
interest in those cases in which the first amendment is domi-
nant, because of a decrease in disclosure motions and orders in
all cases.102
Although the litigant's inability to obtain a disclosure order
may cost him either the information sought or additional time
and money to obtain the information elsewhere, the litigant
faced as great a cost before the courts began protecting journal-
ists' sources.10 s In the past, litigants who have obtained disclo-
sure orders have almost invariably failed in enforcing them.'04
From 1870 to 1970, only three journalists are reported to have
complied with court disclosure orders.105 The resulting court-
press confrontations have benefited no one.'"s For the journalist,
protection of news sources is a matter of professional ethics.1 "1
101. Some disclosure orders are inevitable under a qualified privilege. See supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
102. A decrease in the number of requests for disclosure has benefits beyond those
to the parties directly involved. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
103. Even when courts routinely granted disclosure orders, journalists rarely com-
plied. Protection of News Sources, supra note 1, at 916-18.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Because of the importance to the public of the underlying rights protected
by the federal common law news writer's privilege and because of the "funda-
mental and necessary interdependence of the Court and the press .. .," trial
courts should be cautious to avoid any unnecessary confrontation between the
courts and the press.
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 718 (3d Cir. 1979).
107. "Journalists acknowledge the newsman's ethic of protecting confidential
sources of information." Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Code of
Ethics, § 5. It is an ethic that courts have acknowledged in other settings. A nineteenth
century Michigan case upheld a libel judgment for a journalist falsely accused of violat-
ing a confidence. Tyron Evening News Association, 39 Michigan 636, cited -in Protection
of News Sources, supra note 1, at 27.
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Although the cost of that ethic may mean a jail sentence for con-
tempt, the jail term is a badge of honor that can lead to career
advancement. 10 8 The cost of an unenforced disclosure order,
however, is not limited to the press. The litigant does not obtain
the evidence he is seeking, and the position of the courts is
undermined. 109 The net result of an unenforced court order and
contempt sentence is to "confer martyrdom on the newsman and
scorn on the judicial system."'1 0 A qualified privilege that will
minimize these costly confrontations will serve the interests of
both the courts and the public at no additional cost to the
litigant.
Under the criteria this comment proposes, the journalist for
the Daily Journal-American and his source could have predicted
in advance of publication whether the source's information
would be likely to result in a court disclosure order should
Senear decide to file a libel suit against the paper. If the criteria
indicate a disclosure order is likely, the source may decide to
withhold his information. If the public's first amendment inter-
ests predominate, then the source may disclose his information
for publication because the criteria indicate a disclosure order is
unlikely. In both cases, the courts and the press avoid a possible
costly confrontation. The journalist does not risk a contempt
citation, fine, or jail term. The court avoids the risk of a loss of
public respect. Senear will only fail to get the disclosure order if
the information is available elsewhere, is not essential for his
case, or is sought for a case that lacks merit. By placing more
specific requirements on parties seeking disclosure of confiden-
tial sources in civil cases, the courts provide greater protection
for the public's first amendment interest and reduce the risk of a
costly clash with the press at no irreparable cost to the request-
ing party.
Frank Van Dusen
108. Protection of News Sources, supra note 1, at 27.
109. The rising number and intensity of press-court confrontations are a matter of
national concern. National leaders for both the media and judiciary are calling for more
understanding on both sides. See Brennan, Address at the Dedication of the S.I. New-
house Center for Law and Justice, 32 RUroaas L. REv. 173 (1979).
110. Note, Constitutional Law-Branzburg v. Hayes-Must Newsmen Reveal
Their Confidential Sources to Grand Juries?, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 567, 580 (1972).
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